Introduction
The assessment of the social value of multiperiod effects (costs and benefits) of public policy decisions is usually based on the net present value eriterion. The use of this eriterion is based on two major assumptions: (i) the possibility of expressing all relevant impacts of a decision in a common cardinal (usually monetary) denominator; (ii) the existence of an appropriate social rate of discount which transforms all future flows into present values. Clearly, these two assumptions are not entirely independent: if no monetary cardinal metric can be specified for the effects of a decision on a plan or project, it becomes also problematic to use a conventional social rate of discount; besides, various authors have argued that in case of intangible effects which cannot be valued in a monetary sense, it may be plausible to adjust the social rate of discount.
The present study will mainly focus on the question whether the social rate of discount in public decision-making may be adjusted for specific circumstances. There is already a vast amount of literature (starting off from Hotelling, Pigou and Ramsey in the 1920s) on the role and the value of the discount rate in general, and there is no reason to repeat what has already been said in the literature on this theme. Interested readers are referred to Arrow and Kurz (1970) , Baumol (1968) , Bradford (1975) , Eckstein (1975) , Marglin (1963) ,. Mendelsohn (1981) and Sen (1967) , among others.
Theoretically, the social rate of discount should reflect the opportunity cost of postponement of receipt of any benefit emanating from the implementation of a public investment project. This would require an assessment of welfare foregone by not having these benefits available for immediate consumption or reinvestment. However, the assessment of these opportunity costs is far from easy and often an illusion. In this context, Lind (1982, p. 22) remarks: "...if one were to establish the social rate of discount so that it properly reflected the differences in the opportunity costs and riskiness of different projects and so that it properly reflected the social rate of time preference as well, one would have to set a different rate for almost every project and the choice of the social discount rate would depend upon many things."
Despite the extensive literature on the social rate of discount, it is striking to observe that no concensus among economists has emerged as to the appropriate value of the discount rate in the practice of public policy. Cohsequently, policy practice is usually based on ad hoc rules of thumb which are not thoroughly rooted in economie theory. Large international organizations (the World Bank, e.g.) and national or regional governments are facing an unsatisfactory situation in which their decision cannot firmly be based on economie principles.
It is worth noting that in real-world practice one often uses the market rate of interest as a reasonable proxy for the social rate of discount, Zimmermann (1983) has however recently pointed out several weaknesses inherent in this approach, viz.: -the existence of a 'defective telescopic faculty 1 (Pigou) among consumers; -the neglect of the interest of future generations in case of a decay in their resource base due to the implementation of the project at hand; -the differences in finance policy between public and private projects; -the imperfect functioning of the capital market (including the neglect of distributional impacts); -the difference in handling risks between public and private investments; -the difference in treating social costs (and their distributional impacts) in public and private investment decisions; -the difference in institutional patterns of decision-making between public and private projects (in terms of ex ante coordination, procedural planning and the use of a planning horizon).
Another interesting observation is however that it is increasingly argued that a uniform discount rate which treats all public projects equally -irrespective of the context, their effects and their time horizon -, is difficult to justify from an economie viewpoint.
The present paper aims at providing a systematic review of the arguments pro and contra a uniform discount rate. Four main categories of arguments in favour of a flexible social rate of discount will be distinguished, viz.: (a) the (intergenerational) equity motive (b) the uncertainty and risk motive (c) the financial crowding out motive (d) the externalities and intangibles motive Each of these four classes of motives will critically be reviewed, while the results of these findings will briefly be included in a systematic survey table. It will be concluded that the use of a flexible social rate of discount, which is dependent on specific circumstanceo (e.g., the context, the type of project or the type of impacts), can be justified on the basis of these arguments. • arise if the present generation would neglect to offer a financial compensation to future generations in case of damage to these generations (assessed on the basis of the conventional discount rate). Clearly, if suoh a corapensation would not be taken into consideration (which is usually the case), a reduction in the discount rate raight assure the same effect as the abovementioned compensation (see also Pearce, 1977 ).
In conclusion, given the inertia prevailing in most economies to take into consideration the interest of future generations, a downward adjustment of the value of the conventional rate of social discount is justifiable.
The Uncertainty and Risk Motive
In addition to intergenerational equity issues, it is often argued that uncertainty and risk may yield a reasonable ground for adjusting the social rate of discount. For instance, in the private sector the (private) rate of discount may be diminished (in case of expected but uncertain future costs) or increased (in case of expected but uncertain benefits) (see Haveman, 1977) .
Haveman also criticizes two arguments in favour of the so-called social risk neutrality, viz. the Arrow-Lind theorem (see Arrow and Lind, 1970) and the pooling argument (see Vickrey, 1964) . The ArrowLind theorem implies that the government may neglect the risk associated with a risky project if the risk is borne by the public sector, as in that case the risk is divided among a large number of individuals, making individual risk assessment useless. Haveman argues that this is only a valid assumption if the number of inhabitants is extremely large (more than approx. 80 million) and if the effects of risks in the public sector are entirely independent from the private sector (which is an implausible assumption).
The pooling argument takes for granted that -due to the wide variety of different public projects -risks borne by the government can essentially be better 'pooled' than in the private sector. This assumption however is only valid if there is no correlation between the change in performance of the economy as a whole (measured in terms of GNP, e.g.) and the net benefits of the project concerned.
Given the deficiencies of these two arguments, the author claims that a downward adjustment of the social rate of discount at the cost side of the project -at least in-case of high risks of public projects -is defendable.
In this context however, Baumol (1968) has claimed that for society as a whole the pooling argument is still valid (both for private and public investments), provided the expected net benefits and risks of individual projects are taken into account in order to preclude an inacceptable low level of anticipated performance of these projects. Therefore, in general, uncertainty and risk do not provide sufficiënt arguments for a discrepancy between the public and private social rate of discount. However, as it is coramon in the private sector to include a risk premium discount rate, there is a danger of an artificial -and hence inefficiënt -reallocation of investments towards the public sector. In such cases, a risk premium may also be included in the social rate of return. In general, there is no reason to assume a difference in risks between public and private projects.
Next, Lind (1982) has argued -on the basis of a partial equilibrium approach -that it is neeessary to use a flexible social rate of discount for public projects which is dependent on the specific risks and the way of financing the projects concerned. He uses the concept of a social rate of time preference in the context of an optimal growth model for investments and related market portfolios. The project-specifie, social rate of time preference equals in his specific approach to energy projects the profitability of assets with a risk factor comparable to that of energy projects.
"On the basis of data on after-tax rates of return, we have taken 4.6 percent to be the approximate risk-adjusted real rate of time preference that should apply to projects with the same risk as the market portfolio. Unless a strong argument can be made that the benefits and costs of a public investment or policy will not be highly correlated with the returns to the market portfolio, this should be the discount rate applied to the benefits and costs. On the basis of data on rates of return on Treasury bills, we assume 1 percent is the real rate of time preference on safe investments and that 2 percent is the real rate of time preference associated with a long-term asset such as long-term government bonds, for which the primary risk is the level of interest rates. This last point is important considering energy policy and investments. If the pay-off to energy projects were uncorrelated with the return to the market portfolio, 2 percent would be the appropriate rate for discounting the net benefits of energy investments because such investments would be riskless except for the risk of interest rate changes."(p. 89) Related arguments can be found in Bailey and Jensen (1972) who also advocate an adjustment of discount rates for risks, on the basis of marginal capital costs (given the fact that the achievements of public investments follow -analogous to the private sector -a business cycle).
Thus the conclusion is that a flexible social rate of discount may be justified on the basis of risks incurred in public investments, provided at least there is no official risk compensation in the private sector and provided there is a link between the future variability in the performance of the economy as a whole and that of the project in particular.
4.
The Financial Crowding-out Motive
The way in which a public project is financed and the extent to which this has an irapact on the allocation of investment funds may provide another motive for advocating the possibility of a flexible discount rate. In particular, the crowding-out effect has to be mentioned in this context: if the social rate of discount is not running parallel to the market rate of discount, there is a danger that public projects are implemented that have a lower profitability than (nonimpleraented) projects in the private sector (see Bauraol, 1975, and Bradford, 1975) . Such a misallocation of resources is detrimental to private capital formation or consumption. In order to restore the balance, it would be necessary to have precise insight into the financial sources of these public investments and into the degree to which private capital, consumption and idle balances are affected by crowding-out effects of a specific project.
In this context, Lind (1982) has proposed to assess the shadow price of capital, through which costs and benefits of a public investment projects are transformed into private consumption equivalents. He States:
"By using the concept of the shadow price of capital we can separate the issues of social rate of time preference and the opportunity cost of capital displacement for all public expenditure programs, not just public investraents. These costs are likely to be much less significant for public investraents that stimulate future private investment than for public consumption expenditures that displace private investment but do not stimulate any investment." (p. 55.) It has to be mentioned in this context that also the re-investment fraction of the net benefits of the project concerned are important for assessing the shadow price of capital: more re-investments would imply a higher shadow price of capital. This element is of course also relevant in the context of a multi-generational evaluation of public projects, as in this case it has to be judged whether current decisions open more possibilities for re-investments by future generations. In the view of Lind the value of the abovementioned shadow price is determined by 4 factors: the social rate of time preference, the marginal profitability of investments in the private sector, the marginal savings rate, and the time horizon of the private investments affected by the crowding effects.
In conclusion, the financial crowding-out effect provides a valid motive 'for a flexible social rate of discount. The 'shadow price' approach is in this context a plausible way of taking into consideration the specific consequences of a certain public project.
The Externalities and Intangibles Motive
In conventional cost-benefit analyses it is often usual to exclude social costs and benefits emanating frora externalities or intangibles. Especially the intangible effects which are not measurable in conventional economie terms have to be mentioned her e., particularly because they may have a significant influence on the future welfare position of society. In case of intangible social costs, it is often argued that a downward adjustment of the social rate of discount is necessary in order to impose a more strict filtering condition for-such public projects (cf. Haveman, 1977) . However, in case of irreversible effects it is according to Baumol (1968) preferable to use a selective subsidy policy instead of a downward adjustment of the social rate of discount. Fisher and Krutilla (1975) argue that the environmental opportunity costs of a project, which involves the irreversible conversion of (some part of) a unique natural environment (for example, a dam for hydroelectrie power or open-pit mining), should be calculated using a rate of discount lowered to reflect a shift in tastes over time in favour of the environment (induced by rising income and education levels). The benefits of the project on the other hand should be discounted with a rate that is marked up so as to reflect the annual project-related benefits' depreciation. The latter is caused by technological progress-which will expand capacity to produce ordinary goods and services (but not environments) and thus reduce the relative value of these goods and services.
It should be noted that alternative procedures have been proposed in the literature. For instance, Lind (1982) shows that it is possible to transform environmental effects -analogous to crowding-out effectsby means of a shadow price for available income into consumption equivalents. Another possibility to take into account intangible effects has been proposed by Schulze et al. (1981) , who points out the analogy between the extra payments for dangerous work on the labour market and the necessary compensation for environmental risks in case of public investment projects (see also Thaler and Rosen, 1976) . The authors make a clear distinction between voluntary and compensated risks on the one hand and involuntary and uncompensated risks on the other hand. However, it is worth mentioning that these authors pay little attention to the uncertainty regarding the financial evaluation of social costs (and benefits) for future generations.
In this context, the option value theory may be important, as then it may be possible to assess the monetary value of the aggregate consumer surplus, which is attached by future generations to this value (see Haveman, 1977, and Nash, 1973) . Especially in case of irreversible effects this may be a relevant approach. This may ulti-mately also lead to a change in the social rate of discount, as this is closely related to risk-avert behaviour (see also section 3). It is worthwhile to quote Haveman (1977) here: "All of these adjustments can be translated into a reduction (or increase) in the discount rate used to estimate the present values of future damages (benefits) and, hence, an increase (decrease) in the social evaluation of these effects from the ones indicated by their expected value... Many of the major technological developments -for example, nuclear power -appear to carry with them irreversible negative effects, often having the character of a public good. Assuming that individuals are risk-averse... The cumulative adjustment for uncertainty in these cases implies a need for substantial caution in appraising requests for the commitment of additional social resources to these activities." (pp. 372-373) Similar arguments can be found in Pearce (1977 Pearce ( , 1983 .
In case of exhaustible resources, it has been argued (see Dasgupta and Heal, 1974) that it is important to include also a probability factor for finding suitable substitutes for the resource concerned; this factor is of course determined by technological progress. Furthermore, Myers (1977) has argued that in case of exhaustible living resources a very low social rate of discount (e.g., 1 percent) may be desirable in order to prevent an extinction of certain species.
In conclusion, the externalities and intangibles motive may lead to a valid argument for adjusting the social rate of discount for public investments, either via shadow prices or via option values. Irreversibility and replenishability appear to be of decisive relevance in this respect. Clearly, it has to be admitted that also a direct adjustment of costs and benefits for such intangibles (instead of an indirect adjustment via the discount rate) may still be a useful option.
6* A Systematic Review of Arguments in Favour of a Flexible Social Rate of Discount
Having discussed now in sections 2-5 four major motives for using a flexible discount rate, we will in the present section provide a representative overview of authors who have discussed in the past the various arguments pro and contra a flexible social rate of discount for public investment planning. For the ease of presentation we will use a systematic survey table, which gives a listing of the abovementioned four motives, as well as a listing of successive authors. It has to be added that this table is mainly indicative: absolute judgements or statements are hard to draw from the wide variety of contributions in the literature. But an attempt has been made to present each author's position more precisely by making a distinction between the following aspects of an affirmative argument supporting the use of a flexible social rate of discount: (i) the judgement of public projeets should explicitly take into account the effects associated with (at least one of) the four abovementioned motives for using a flexible discount rate. (ii) the judgement of a public project may be based explicitly on a social rate of discount that may vary among different projeets. (iii) the use of a flexible social rate of discount for judging a public project as a whole may implicitly be defended in the light of the intention or way of reasoning of the author concerned. (iv) the judgement of a public project may explicitly be based on a social rate of discount that varies among the components or aspects of a particular project. (v) the use of a flexible social rate of discount which varies among the components or aspects of a project may implicitly be defended in the light of the arguments used by the author concerned. Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview of our literature search, based on 24 authors.
It is interesting to observe that problems of intergenerational equity receive much attention in the literature. The remaining motives receive less attention, although the frequency of occurrence of these motives is more or less equal. The final conclusion from our previous analysis is rather straightforward. Economists have provided a wealth of arguments that justify the use of a flexible social rate of discount, based on four classes of motives. Our typological approach does not lead to the normative conclusion that flexible social rates of discount are by definition necessary, but to the more modest conclusion that -in a particular context with a particular project and particular impacts -the use of a flexible social rate of discount is plausible, as it may be defended on economie grounds. 
